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Abstract 
 
 The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) 
(WorkChoices) together with the Employment and Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Welfare to Work) and Other Measures Act 2005 (Cth) (Welfare to 
Work) have brought about a new era for workers. This paper considers the 
cumulative effect of these two legislative changes on working women in 
Australia.  It concludes that in a number of important ways, the cumulative effect 
of the two Acts has very negative consequences for women in Australia.  These 
ways, including likely increased casualisation, increased working hours and 
increased uncertainty of hours, are important in themselves, but the thesis of the 
paper is that the changes must be considered not in isolation but in a broader 
social context.  After doing so, we conclude that the effect of the legislative 
changes impacts most severely on women in Australia.  On this basis, we call for 
a review of the way in which the Acts combined produce a raft of negative effects 
for women.  The raft of legislation can be seen to entrench marginalisation of 
women in the workplace. 
 
Introduction 
 
The main object of labour law has always been, and I venture to say will always be, a countervailing 
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the 
employment relationship. (Otto Kahn-Freund 1972, 8)  
 
A review of the changes under the Welfare to Work and WorkChoices legislation and their 
cumulative effect is important when considering women in the workforce. This effect was 
something the Government discouraged by limiting the terms of reference for the Senate 
inquiry (November 2005) into the WorkChoices legislation, to exclude welfare changes.  
 
The Howard Government argues these legislative changes will work to encourage people off 
welfare and into work, giving us a more prosperous economic outlook and more flexible 
work/life balance. Part I of the paper considers the changes to welfare and working conditions 
and their suggested rationale.  Part II of the paper will consider the cumulative impact of these 
changes on women.  We examine a range of ways in which the legislation might impact 
particularly on women, taking into account child care issues and parental leave rights (which 
have not changed).  We will make comparative assessments with other OECD countries to 
benchmark the new Australian standard.  We will conclude in Part III that the combined effect 
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of the legislative changes will impact disproportionately on women in Australia, although this 
may not have been intended.  We call for a reconsideration of these legislative changes on the 
grounds that their (negative) impact on women is too great.  This may not have been evident  
to its architects given the narrow range of the inquiry before the laws were implemented.  
 
Our method seeks to re-establish links between social security measures on the one hand, and 
the law regulating workplaces and industrial relations on the other.  This is not a novel 
concept in international terms (Sarfati (2003) and Ramia, Chapman and Michelotti, 2005), 
and enjoyed some support in the late nineteenth century (Webb (1897); but it has escaped 
serious attention in the Australian literature until recently.  Polanyi (1944) saw the 
relationship between labour markets and social concerns facing workers in terms of a double 
movement consisting of 
 
The action of two organising principles … The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at 
the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using 
largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection, aiming 
at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organisation, relying on the varying support of 
those immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – primarily, but not exclusively, the 
working and the landed classes – and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other 
instruments of intervention as its methods. 
 
Polanyi believed if the market were left unregulated, it would ‘commodify’ labour to the point 
where it was robbed of its ability to maximise productive output, a failure of the capitalist 
system which had already been noted by Marx (1906).  We see the risk in the changes 
considered here collectively as a failure of this kind.  As originally conceived, industrial 
relations systems had a protective function, including questions such as unemployment 
insurance, the need to supplement the law with social policy measures to prevent destitution, 
and questions of exploitation, underemployment and poverty.  Over time this was lost.  
Ramia, Chapman and Michelotti (2005) lament the eventual domination of the principles of 
labour law over broader social policy issues.  In discussing the plight of women in relation to 
the new system here, this can be seen as an overarching theme.  The changes to WorkChoices 
cannot and should not be seen in isolation, but as part of a much broader social policy canvas.  
The canvas includes the historical ways in which women have been marginalised in the 
Australian workplace, and the continuing participation challenges faced by working women. 
  
PART I: CHANGES AND THEIR SUGGESTED RATIONALE 
 
Rationale for Reform 
Changes made by WorkChoices are said to be designed to encourage high employment, 
improve living standards, lower inflation and encourage international competitiveness through 
higher productivity and a more flexible labour market. The Government claims the changes 
will lead to a simplified national system of workplace relations, while providing a safety net 
for workers. Central to the changes is the encouragement given to individual employer and 
employee bargaining, and further decentralisation of employee relations decision-making. 
 
Though the Federal Government may not say explicitly that it has set out to reduce wage 
costs, this is a clear impact of the legislation, with its removal of guaranteed penalty and 
overtime rates.  Others have noted that Australia’s minimum wage rate is high compared with 
that of other OECD countries which is said to undermine Australia’s competitiveness (Ryan, 
2005, Moore, 2005).  Wooden (2005, 1781-79) has questioned the expertise of the Australian 
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Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and complained about the Commission constantly 
increasing the minimum wage, claiming that  
 
Either it does not care about the jobless or … it believes there is no relation between the price of labour and the 
quantity demanded … the AIRC has little or no experience that would enable it to make sound decisions which 
take account of the economic effects of minimum wage increases 
 
A range of literature suggests that deregulation of the labour market will increase 
employment.  Borland and Woodbridge (1999) for example claim that deregulation of wage 
rates in Australia would increase employment of the low paid by 10-15%.  Gregory, Klug and 
Martin (1999) make a similar argument. 
 
The argument in favour of these reforms has also been made on productivity grounds.  For 
example, Ryan (2005) estimated that without past labour market reform, Australia’s 
productivity growth would have been 1% lower each year between 1994 and 2002.  Harding 
(2002) estimated that existing unfair dismissal laws cost Australian business $1.3 billion, or 
0.2% of GDP.  The Prime Minister himself complained that Australian companies being 
forced to comply with six different workplace relations systems was an ‘anachronism’.   
  
The McClure Report (2000), commissioned by the Department of Family and Community 
Services, endorsed OECD-driven changes to reduce welfare dependency and acknowledged 
the importance of tax and social security on labour. Western countries are facing the dilemma 
of ageing populations and this was considered in the Intergenerational Report (2002-3). Both 
reports significantly alter the historical conceptions of labour law and social security law, 
bringing the two together for the first time in this country (Rider 2005). The McClure Report 
promoted the concept of mutual obligation whereby recipients of welfare are obligated to  
genuinely seek work. This was to be encouraged through facilitating re-entry, (the carrot), 
into the work force and financial sanctions (the stick). This was also the purpose of the 
Working Nations policies under the Keating Government.  The ageing population dilemma 
presents governments with the spectre of ballooning costs for health and pensions along with 
a diminishing work force and an associated reduced ability to raise taxes, not to mention 
challenges for employers trying to find workers, and economic productivity.  Coupled with 
these changes is the privatisation of job centres in 1997 to the Job Network. This means 
private agencies utilising entrepreneurial approaches for job matching of job seekers are now 
working together with the social security arm, namely Centrelink, a government-created body.  
 
The marked difference with the Howard Government’s approach and the Keating 
Government’s approach, as well as those in other OECD Countries such as the UK, is to rely 
heavily on the ‘stick’ aspect of encouragement as against the ‘carrot’ approach, which is more 
inclined to emphasise retraining and education to encourage workers to independence from 
welfare, rather than utilising sanctions (Carney 2006, 31).  The Government is clearly 
attempting to reduce reliance on welfare, while also encouraging secondary earners in dual-
income households out of the work force (Rider 2005). 
 
Welfare to Work: Employment and Workplace Relations Amendment (Welfare to 
Work) and Other Measures Act 2005 (Cth).   
The Welfare to Work legislation has made significant changes in income support 
arrangements, in particular for sole parents, mature-aged workers and people who receive a 
Disability Support Pension (DSP). The Government believes finding a job for parents is the 
best way to help children and families. This runs counter to notions of anti-discrimination and 
 
Anthony Gray and Pauline Collins 
equal opportunity by not allowing individuals to make that assessment for themselves, raising 
the question whether any job is better than no job. 
 
Before the changes, sole parents were eligible for Parenting Payment Single (PPS) until their 
youngest child turned 16.  PPS is a pension level payment, providing $256.05 a week plus 
various supplements and a pensioner concession card.  The income test allows a recipient to 
earn $76.30 a week (plus $12.30 for each extra child after the first) while receiving full 
payment, and payment is reduced by 40 cents per dollar for income above that level.  One 
partner in a couple with children was eligible for Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP) until the 
youngest child turned 16.  PPS was, and still is, aligned with Newstart Allowance (NA), the 
unemployment benefit.  Parenting Payment recipients were not required to seek work, except 
for some moderate obligations when their youngest child reached 13.  Families with children 
are also eligible for (means-tested) Family Tax Benefit Parts A and B, whether they receive 
other Centrelink benefits or not. 
 
From 1 July 2006, PPP for new claimants who are partnered has been restricted to those 
whose youngest child is aged less than six (Sch 4: s5 Welfare to Work). Sole parents may 
claim PPS until their youngest child turns eight, but from the time the child turns six, must 
look for at least 15 hours of work a week.  Once the youngest child is eight, they will need to 
apply for NA, unless they are entitled to another payment. This allowance is paid at a lower 
rate and has a much less generous income test than the PPS and requires the receiver to seek 
work (making ten job applications a fortnight) and accept any suitable job offer between 15-
25 hours of work a week (Sch 7: s68). Parents already receiving PPS (before 1 July 2006) 
must, once their youngest child turns six, seek part-time employment of at least 15 hours a 
week but they will continue to receive the Parenting Payment until their youngest child turns 
16 (Sch 4: s5).  As NATSEM (2005) and Wong (2006) have indicated, the problem with the 
Newstart Allowance is the very high effective marginal tax rates for recipients, because of the 
very steep rate at which the benefit is withdrawn. 
 
The Welfare to Work Act provides the penalties for compliance failures for PPS (s8) and NA 
(Sch 7: s73). These payments are withheld for eight weeks for repeat or serious breaches of 
the activity test or an Activity Agreement (Sch 7: s73). Serious breaches include cases where 
the individual leaves a job, loses a job for misconduct, fails to take up a job offer that the 
Centrelink or the Job Network considers suitable, or fails to take up or complete a Work for 
the ‘Dole’ requirement. Carney (2006) and Rider (2005) argue the sanctioning regime is 
becoming harsher with fewer controls and more discretion. The number of people affected is 
significant:  
 
…DEWR figures disclosed that 106,000 breaches were imposed in the 12 months to 2005, 64,000 of 
which were the heavier activity test breaches, and 3,800 were third breach, ‘total loss of payment’ 
penalties (Senate 2005 in Carney 2006, 36-37).  
 
There are a number of exemptions.  In addition to the range of exemptions for other Newstart 
recipients, such as temporary incapacity and family crises, there are exemptions for foster 
carers, home schoolers, people with children with disabilities, and a six month exemption for 
those who have left their partner following domestic violence.  Unsuitable work includes 
work outside school hours where there is no suitable childcare.  Subject to exceptions, parents 
need not accept jobs requiring travel for more than 60 minutes either way, where the cost of 
travel exceeds 10% of the gross wage, or where the financial return from work, after the costs 
of travel and childcare, and the effects of tax and income support withdrawal, is less than $25 
per week (Sch 4:s7–PP; Sch 7: S41-NA).  
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The success of the Government’s Welfare to Work policy depends on the availability of 
affordable and appropriate childcare for single parents in particular. The Government 
responded to the issue of childcare shortages in the 2006-07 Federal Budget with the removal 
of caps on the number of places for after-school and family daycare, leaving it to the 
marketplace to satisfy supply and demand, with an estimated creation of a further 25,000 
childcare places by 2009. It is not clear that this change will resolve the problem of access to 
childcare.  One problem for low income families is the cost of childcare above the amount 
covered by the Child Care Benefit. 
 
Under the former rules, Parenting Payment recipients were free to participate in education or 
training.  Sole parents were entitled to an education supplement of $31.20 a fortnight (2006 
rate) and an annual payment of $208.  The supplement is not available for Newstart recipients 
and the annual payment is only available once.  Those not now eligible for Parenting 
Payment, who apply for Newstart, are not generally permitted to study as an alternative to 
looking for work, and must look for work while also engaging in education, if they so choose, 
without this assistance.  For a supporting parent, this will leave little time for family and 
leisure and places demands on childcare availability.  The alternative is to claim Austudy, 
which pays sole parents a rate even lower than that of Newstart and requires full-time study.  
Austudy was not amended under Welfare to Work to take account of the special needs of sole 
parents.   
 
Various concessions are made to sole parents claiming Newstart, including access to the 
Pharmaceutical Allowance and Pensioner Concession Card.  The legislation also eased the 
income test for all Newstart recipients.  Newstart is reduced if a recipient’s income is over 
$31 a week.  The reduction rate is 50 cents per dollar for income between $31 and $125 a 
week, and 60 cents per dollar of income over $125 (Rider 2005).  There is no allowance in the 
income test for additional children.  As at 2006-2007, the minimum wage is $12.74 per hour.  
Harding et al (2005a and b) prepared economic models for NATSEM in which they predicted 
the possible net gain for a sole parent with one child moving from 0 to 15 hours work a week 
could be as little as $31 a week, with the Government receiving a tax windfall of $114 a 
week, as well as savings from reduced social security payments. Table 1 describes the 
predicted positions for average pay rates and thresholds, reflecting high effective marginal tax 
rates for the NA: 
 
Table 1: Predicted positions for average pay rates and thresholds, 2006-07 
 
  PPS  NA Difference 
Payment rate – 1 child $257 per  
week 
$228 per 
week 
-$29 
Max amount earnable before payment is reduced 76 31 -$46 
Withdraw rate for each $1 private income above 
threshold 
40% 50% +10% 
Second income test threshold n/a $125  
Withdraw rate for each $1 private income above 
threshold 
40% 60% +20% 
Income Support Zero When Income Reaches $718 $426 $292 
Source: Harding et al. (2005a, 17) 
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The Government estimates that by 2008-09, 95,100 sole parents and 26,100 partnered parents 
will be affected, and around 4,800 will receive no payment (Carney 2006). This policy change 
is not family friendly. This requires encouraging workers out of the workforce so there is no 
job displacement. Workers identified as suiting this need are naturally second-income earners, 
for whom the Government does not have to provide social security, owing to the income of 
the primary earner. This occurs through the Government’s changes to the Family Tax Benefit 
(A) and (B).   
 
Family Tax Benefit (A) is paid per child at a maximum rate of $4318 per annum for children 
under 13 and $5333 for children 13-15 years. While FTB (A) is tax exempt, it is means tested 
and reduced by 20-30 cents in the dollar for family income over $40,000. Family Tax Benefit 
(B) is paid per family.  It is not income tested for single income families (sole parents or 
single income couples) but is reduced by 20 cents in the dollar of the second earner’s income 
over $4,000. This means second earners in a family are put at a disadvantage by paying tax 
and losing their FTB (B) if they earn over the threshold. Thus the FTB (B) acts as a 
disincentive to work when in a double-income family.  The potential loss of childcare 
entitlements, as well as loss of FTB (A) and Parenting Payments if a partner’s income is high, 
is also a disincentive to work, and usually this applies to the woman (McDonald 2003). 
Clearly this policy aims to have one parent, invariably the woman, being the non-wage 
earning carer, as parents on high incomes are discourage from choosing to share the care and 
work equally. This is because FTB (B) compensates single income families for having access 
to only one tax-free threshold (HREOC Discussion Paper 2005). The provision of tax cuts in 
the 2006-07 Federal Budget of $6,200 a year to single income earners on $150,000 with no 
dependent children, compared to just $730 a year to dual-income earners on $30,000 with two 
children, or $783 to a single parent with two children, indicates that the gap in wealth in 
Australia is likely to grow and families are not the highest priority. 
 
The reforms intrude into the private sphere of the family and often result in imbalance and 
inequity, favouring employers. Women now form a substantial part of our workforce and 
have entered into tertiary education (ABS, 2004) in a significant way. In 2003, the proportion 
of women aged 25-34 years with a higher education qualification exceeded that of men (28 
percent and 23 percent respectively), whereas a decade earlier, the proportions for men and 
women aged 25-34 were both about 13 percent.  Women are also increasing in the work force 
while men are declining (Pocock 2005a). However, with one in four workers being 
responsible for the care of children or the aged or the disabled, government and corporate 
assistance will be required to support this. Employers might offer childcare facilities to 
support the unsociable and longer work hours they require of their employees. The Welfare to 
Work reforms mean people looking for any sort of paid work, whether it is casual, 
impermanent or part-time, while still having considerable family and carer commitments.  As 
Cass (2006) has noted, women who have been out of the workplace for a lengthy period with 
family commitments can face high barriers to re-entry. 
 
WorkChoices Legislation  
The Act, validated by the High Court on 14 November, 2006, defines an employee in s4AB as 
someone employed by an ‘employer’. This definition clearly relies largely on the corporations 
power (s51[20] Constitution). An employer includes a business entity that is a constitutional 
corporation.  This will cover the vast majority of workers, since according to the Federal 
Government’s estimates in 2000; corporations employ at least 85percent of non-farm labour 
in Australia (Reith 2000). 
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The Act intends to override most of the existing State industrial relations jurisdictions (s7C).   
Notably, state laws (including state awards) will no longer be able to include provisions about 
pay rates.  Generally, an award or workplace agreement prevails over a valid State law in the 
event of inconsistency.   Many advances in the working rights of women have been made at 
the State rather than federal level.  The new Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) takes 
over many of the previous functions of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(AIRC).  In particular, the AFPC is responsible for the setting of minimum wage levels in 
Australia (s7I).  The AIRC has been credited with greatly advancing equal pay for women.  
Peetz (2007) found that the first AFPC decision on minimum wages represented an average 
real wage cut of 1%; this decision affected mostly women. 
 
The Act encourages the making of an individual employment agreement between an employer 
and employee, called an Australian Workplace Agreement (AWA).  The Act provides for an 
expedited ‘approval process’ for an AWA – an agreement must be signed and dated by both 
parties, and the signatures must be witnessed.  The agreement is lodged with the Employment 
Advocate but, unlike the previous system, there is no vetting of agreements.  In the past, an 
AWA had to be approved by the Employment Advocate, who would make sure the agreement 
passed the ‘no disadvantage’ test.   
 
Part VI provides for awards, focusing on their simplification and rationalisation.  The 
amendments seek to reduce the number of awards, which currently total more than 4000 
(Federal and State).  Awards will be restricted in their content to 13 matters, a reduction from 
the current 20.  Some topics are specifically excluded from awards, including transfers from 
one type of employment to another.  This particularly affects women seeking conversion from 
part-time to full-time work.   An employer has the right under the new laws to request an 
employee to work on a particular public holiday.  The employee will no longer be guaranteed 
penalty rates for doing so, but these may be negotiated.  Of course, unfair dismissal laws do 
not apply to casuals, a category of employment of particular relevance to women and to which 
we now turn. 
 
PART II HOW THE ACTS COLLECTIVELY UNDERMINE WOMEN AT WORK 
Our argument in this paper is that these changes impact on women to a disproportionate 
extent.  This may not have been fully realised when the changes were introduced, given the 
lack of thought evidently given to the broader issue of industrial relations.  In justifying our 
assertion that the Acts impact women to a greater extent, we consider now some aspects of 
the legislative changes considered most relevant to women. 
 
1. The Act further encourages further casualisation of the workforce and this 
affects women more. 
Australia has among the highest rates of casualisation in the OECD world.  In 2003 the figure 
reached almost two million workers (26%).  From 1994 to 2004 31 percent of female workers 
were employed on a casual basis, compared with men whose casualisation increased from 16 
to 22% (ABS, 2006). Scholars have noted the tradition of the Australian labour market starts 
with the myth of the unencumbered worker, a person (read ‘man’, at least initially in the 
Harvester case) who is not ‘encumbered’ by family or domestic responsibilities (Berns 2002).  
The model assumed the man as the breadwinner, with the woman as homemaker and 
financially dependent on her husband.  While thankfully the model has evolved over time, 
Berns sees the development of casual work for women as a fragmentation of the labour force 
into a core of male full-time unencumbered workers, supplemented by a periphery of female 
secondary workers.  
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The result of the legislative reforms, to remove restrictions in awards on the right of an 
employer to employ casuals, is expected to see a further increase in the number of casual 
employees, with 22% of all new jobs created since 1996 being casual. During the Howard 
Government, Australia has seen casual positions, compared to permanent ones, reach a 1:3 
ratio. This means 2.3 million workers have no entitlements to holidays or sick leave, and 
cannot access unfair dismissal laws. One of the incentives for casual workers to trade-off 
security and entitlements, is the increased pay loading. Under WorkChoices this loading will 
be 20 percent but subject to change by the Fair Pay Commission.  This loading aims to 
compensate casual employees for the lack of other entitlements, but is not enshrined. Casuals 
also have no access to unfair dismissal protections (which themselves have been watered 
down by the new laws). 
 
Deregulation of the workforce will in most cases lead to increased casualisation (Dawkins & 
Norris 1990; Dawkins et al. 1993) This has particular implications for women, given their 
increased reliance on casual employment.  Often women seeking work/life balance have little 
choice other than casual labour - 34.3 percent of women working casually have dependent 
children (ABS, 2001).  Owens (1990), Gaze (2001) and Chapman (2005) have noted how the 
labour market and labour regulation continue to benefit the Harvester-worker at the expense 
of casual employees. 
 
While increased casualisation creates a more flexible workforce and is desired by business, 
there is evidence that this change will impact women’s wages.  Women are already over-
represented in the numbers of low-paid employees and earn about 85 per cent of male 
earnings for the same work (ABS, 2004, Cat.6302).  Webster and Tseng (2002) found a 
positive correlation between wage rises of six percent or above and (male) gender during the 
early years of individual agreement making in Australia. Further, there was a much higher 
likelihood of wage rises for full-time employees than part-time or casual employees.  A 
Canadian study by Jackson and Schellenberg (1999), supported by the work of Peetz (2005), 
found that ‘casual workers fare worse under AWAs than collective agreements, compared to 
more permanent workers, with a gap of 15 percent’, and concluded that, controlling for other 
factors 
 
Collective bargaining coverage has significant positive impacts in terms of raising pay and access to 
benefits, and in terms of reducing the incidence of low pay among women workers (Jackson and 
Schellenberg 1999).  
 
Pocock et al. (2004, 44) in an important study of casual employees in Australia note that ’65 
percent have a negative or very negative view of their casual terms’.  Campbell and Brosnan 
(1999) see deregulation as increasing casual employment, given: 
1.  It widens the gap in protection as a result of exemptions and special provisions;  
2.  It lessens the likelihood of compliance with regulatory conditions due to its effect of 
limiting enforcement and limiting the legitimacy of compliance; and 
3.  It expands the poorly regulated and unregulated sectors outside of award coverage.  
 
Casual workers often lack both control and influence in their employment (Hall et al. 1998) as 
well as suffering an obvious lack of job security (Burgess & Campbell 1998). An Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995 found 35 percent of permanent employees 
satisfied with their influence over workplace decisions, compared with only 22 percent of 
casual employees. Casual employment masks the problem of underemployment (Burgess & 
Mitchell 2001). While it has been called flexible, the reality is that casual work does not 
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provide choice or flexibility for the worker.  Pocock et al’s (2004) study found 32 percent of 
casuals saw all flexibility belonging to the employer, at their expense. Women in violent 
relationships having uncertain job security are more likely to stay, even if the relationship is 
causing them harm.  
 
Financial institutions are finding creative ways to maintain lending, for instance lending 
against equity in existing property, or low-documentation loans (at higher interest). However, 
if women have no property ownership, they are unlikely to be able to enter the property 
market while they are in casual employment. Single parents on low incomes do not have 
access to the options available to dual-income earners, particularly the self employed, in tax 
minimisation such as income-splitting, spouse superannuation contributions, family trust 
options and negative gearing in relation to shares and property.  Of course, superannuation is 
not available to casual employees (as it is to permanent employees, whether full or part-time), 
so to the extent that a woman has been in casual employment throughout her career, that may 
impact on her ability to provide herself with a comfortable retirement. 
 
Some workers are not clear even of the basis of their employment (see NSW Office for 
Women, Information Paper 2005 in which a survey of 5,000 younger workers (under 25) 
revealed half could not tell the difference between casual and permanent work and a quarter 
had never received a pay slip), then the likelihood of ensuring they have appropriate pay and 
conditions is doubtful. This lack of regularity in employment exacerbates the already 
burdensome notification requirements under social security law. As Knegt (2002) argues, 
more flexibility is required in social security law enforcement, taking into account the 
flexibility in labour laws and more hybrid transitory forms of employment. 
 
The changes made by the Federal Government are likely to increase the percentage of the 
Australian workforce employed on a casual basis.  This is likely to affect women more than 
men.  There are a range of difficulties encountered by casual employees, as this section of the 
paper has noted.  Thus, this change is likely to impact more on women. 
 
2. Less Reliance on Awards is Generally Bad for Women; Greater Reliance on 
Bargaining is Generally Bad for Women 
We have seen that under the changes, the number of awards is to be reduced 10 fold and their 
content reduced from 20 to 13 allowable matters.  No doubt, the influence of awards is set to 
diminish in the industrial landscape in Australia. 
 
This change particularly affects women.  As Kirby J noted in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (2006), that system is often credited with great advances in the working 
conditions of women in Australia in the past 50 years, including the right of equal pay for 
equal work. Norris (1986) credits Australia’s award system with reducing the differential 
between the average wage levels of men and women to a much smaller level than in the 
United States or United Kingdom, as does Peetz (2007). Important test cases that have been 
heard by the AIRC include Maternity Leave (1979); Adoption Leave (1984); Parental Leave 
(1990); Carers’ Leave (1994/95); Right to Refuse Unreasonable Overtime (2001); Right to 
Request Part-Time Employment After Parental Leave; and Request Variation in Work Hours 
(2005).  Owens (2005) credits the work of the AIRC in creating more family-friendly 
flexibility in working conditions.  As Peetz has noted (2007b), women are far more reliant on 
awards than men, and those reliant on awards have most to lose from WorkChoices, given the 
stripping back of award contents.  The independence of the arbitrator is now lost, with the 
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Government replacing its role with the Fair Pay Commission to which it directly appoints 
members.  
 
Prior to the introduction of WorkChoices, 60 percent of women were dependent on safety net 
standards. Peetz (2005) has noted that in 2005 casual workers (as indicated, women are over-
represented in this category) on AWAs received 15 percent less income and women on 
AWAs received 11 percent less income than those on registered collective agreements, with 
individual agreements fixing wages for a longer time, up to five years. This move against 
collective bargaining goes against ILO principles which favour the collective right to bargain.  
 
Women and Individual Bargaining  
There exists concern about the extent to which women feel comfortable bargaining for their 
workplace rights. Kolb et al. (2003) claims women are not as assertive in standing up for their 
workplace rights as men (as a general proposition). Baird and Todd (2005) found the disparity 
between the wages of men and women was greater when individual agreements were being 
used. A survey by Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) found that women tended to shy away 
from competitive environments while men were keener to compete, despite there being no 
difference in their performance levels. Men were more confident about their talent, with three 
quarters believing they were the best in a group, compared to about 40 percent of women. 
Carney argues: 
 
… there is no equality between the individual worker or welfare client (the ‘consumer’), and the more 
powerful and more organised employer or welfare provider (Centrelink and/or the Job Network). The 
falsity of that assumption of ‘equality’ of bargaining power, exposes the intellectual bankruptcy of 
reforms which effectively oust/weaken public law protections (a reduced role for labour arbitration or 
welfare review), and which now leave non-standard workers vulnerable to contractual exploitation 
whether in work or not. 
 
One area lack of bargaining power impacts is the ability to determine hours, particularly where a worker 
is casual and can be called in at short notice to cover high demand periods and left wondering if they 
will have hours when business is quiet. On-call employees are good for employers but the effect on the 
employee is considerable (Carney 2006, 30-31). 
 
Peetz (2007a, 2007b), in comparing average hourly earnings for non-managerial employees, 
found that the rate for women was about 89% that of men in 2006 (down from 91% in 2004).  
The difference between rates of pay was greatest for women on individual agreements. 
 
Further, of course the less one is paid, the less bargaining power the person has.  Yet women 
are highly over-represented in the ranks of the low-paid; women comprise 47% of the 
workforce but 65% of all those earning less than $500 per week (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2004b).  Further, the welfare changes discussed earlier encourage women back to 
the workforce once their children reach school age, in the way that benefits are reduced at this 
time.  A woman in this position may not be in a strong bargaining position when she knows 
she has financial responsibility for the welfare of her children.  A sole female parent who 
knows that if they knock back a workplace agreement lacking penalty rates, overtime, shift 
allowances, redundancy pay and leave loading, they may breach the new welfare rules and 
may be ‘punished’ by a temporary withdrawal of benefits, is not in a strong bargaining 
position.  Strachan and Burgess (2000) point to the ‘incompatibility of decentralised 
bargaining and equal employment opportunity in Australia’. 
 
A study of Queensland Workplace Agreements in the late 1990s compared individual and 
enterprise agreements. For example, QWAs were found to be less likely to include family-
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friendly measures, training, consultation and occupational health and safety provisions. Only 
one of the 122 QWAs studied referred to balancing work and family life, compared with 11 
out of the 85 certified agreements (Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and 
Training (ACIRRT) 1999). Wilkinson (2005) has reviewed the effects of inequality at an 
international level and finds a direct correlation between greater inequality in income levels 
and levels of violence, community disintegration and poorer health outcomes. 
 
In 1995, the ABS found that males doing overtime were paid about 45 percent of the time; 
women doing overtime were paid about 26 percent of the time. While differences in 
occupations may explain some of the difference, it is possible that some of the difference may 
be attributable to the willingness of workers to insist on their legal entitlements.  
 
For these reasons, it is submitted that the move away from awards, and the move away from 
collective bargaining and towards individual bargaining, impacts greater on women. 
 
3. Longer Working Hours Hurt Women More 
It is clear that one of the effects of the legislation is likely to be that workers will work more 
hours.  This reflects Berns’ (2002) concept of Australian labour law and labour markets’ 
assumption that workers are ‘unencumbered’ by family or domestic responsibilities, so they 
are available to work any time, and on short notice.  This is a natural consequence of reducing 
the cost of labour (by removing a right to penalty and overtime rates), reducing the guarantee 
of annual leave (from four weeks to two) and by removing statements about maximum and 
minimum hours of work from awards.  This is noteworthy, given evidence that already 
Australians generally work among the highest number of hours in a given week in the world, 
and this is increasing (Campbell 2005; Peetz et al. 2003; Pocock 2005a).  Women’s 
participation rates in the workforce continue to increase, at a time when four in ten Australian 
workers (mostly women) have responsibility for the care of someone else (Pocock and 
Masterman-Smith (2005)). 
 
Pocock argues that unsociable working hours, which in 2000 included 64 percent of workers 
working overnight and on weekends (ABS, 2002, 132), impact on families:  
   
Various international studies find that unsocial working time is associated with negative social, 
psychological and health effects for workers, and with emotional, developmental and cognitive 
problems in children (Pocock 2005b, 10).  
 
Han (2005) also found 
 
Negative effects of working non-standard hours on an adult’s psychological (eg depression), social (eg 
marital instability), and physical (eg fatigue, quality of sleep) well being … for example, working 
rotating shifts or irregular hours has been significantly associated with problems related to health, sleep 
and individuals’ psychological performance … Working at nights may alter the body’s circadian 
rhythms, leading to sleep disruption, fatigue, digestive disorders, and a greater risk of cardiovascular 
disease … Such adverse impacts on maternal well-being raise concerns about the potential impact – 
directly or indirectly – of mothers’ non-standard schedules on their children’s wellbeing 
 
Families require predicability of work hours; children need routine. Holidays are a good 
opportunity for family time together.  Pocock and Clarke (2004) showed that many children 
value time with parents over more money, regardless of socio-economic background.  
Families are being placed second in the demand for their lifestyle to change to fit business 
cycle demands and business and government must accommodate this imbalance. Campbell et 
al. (2005) note the number of hours worked is a shallow gauge, and more attention must be 
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paid to schedules and flexibility of hours. According to the 1995 AWIRS survey, stress-
related illnesses for women increase as they work more hours. No similar effect appears for 
men working longer hours (Wooden 2000). It is thus a reasonable conclusion that one of the 
effects of the legislative changes will be to increase stress-related illness in women. An 
ACTU survey Employment Security and Working Hours – A National Survey of Current 
Workplace Issues (July 1999) found that 41 per cent of respondents reported being 
dissatisfied with the balance between work and family. That percentage is unlikely to drop as 
a result of the 2005 and 2006 changes. 
 
While parents on NA or PPS do have a right to refuse a job if the hours are too long or if they 
occur when there is no child care available, they are in a difficult position if the hours 
required are unpredictable.  If they leave the job for this reason, they need to convince 
Centrelink that it was justified.  While the new rules allow this, the parent may not fully 
understand their rights. 
 
Of course, sick leave is not a guaranteed right for casual employees, so to the extent that 
women are proportionately over-represented in the ranks of casual staff, this is an issue.  Sick 
women will be forced either to take time off without pay, or attend work while sick.  A single 
woman with a sick child who is in child care also faces the difficulty that child care centres 
will not accept a sick child.  The mother may be forced to try to make short term 
arrangements (Winchester 1990, Lee 2005).   
 
Other OECD countries have recognised the need to provide flexibility for workers with 
children (Fagan, 2004, Fagnani and Letablier, 2004). The UK Employment Act 2002 gives 
parents with children under six the right to request flexibility in their work hours where they 
have 26 weeks or greater continuous work experience. Employers must consider these 
requests but can refuse on various grounds relating to the business needs. The Netherlands has 
more protective legislation in this regard in the Working Time Adjustment Act 2000. The 
AIRC Family Provisions Test Case also gave recognition to this issue but has been overturned 
by WorkChoices (Pocock 2005a).   
 
Britain’s Employment Act 2002 (UK) has recognised the need for paid parental leave allowing 
for 26 weeks’ paid leave, and the Work and Families Act 2005 (UK) which introduces 
initiatives such as keep-in-touch days for workers on parental leave. New Zealand has 
recently increased the right of all workers, including casuals, to three weeks’ paid holiday 
leave entitlements, with a further increase to four weeks in 2007. The ILO has recommended 
a base minimum of 14 weeks’ paid parental leave. The minimum right to parental leave 
introduced in the WorkChoices legislation is substantially below that ordered by the AIRC 
Family Provisions Test Case on 8 August 2005, which is now overruled by the legislative 
changes. The case had given an employee entitled to parental leave (N.B. not all parents) a 
'right to request' their employer to 
• simultaneous unpaid parental leave up to a maximum of eight weeks 
• extended unpaid parental leave from 52 weeks to a maximum of 104 weeks, and 
• permission to return from parental leave on a part-time basis until the child reaches school 
age.  
Such decisions of the AIRC will no longer be possible under the new legislation. The risk 
with the WorkChoices legislation is that even good employers will be forced to reduce 
employment conditions to meet the lowest in the market place, to be able to compete on a 
level playing field.  By 1999, Australia rated seventeenth out of 20 countries studied by 
Jaumotte (2004) when comparing family support mechanisms. Only Spain, New Zealand and 
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Mexico fared worse.  We should not expect AWAs will engender any enthusiasm for paid 
maternity leave (Baird 2005).    
 
Of course, if women are expected to work more hours, accessible child care becomes 
important.  This applies to two parent families but to a greater extent to sole parent families.   
Nearly one quarter of Australian families are sole parents and the predictions are for a 
continued growth in sole parent families (ABS, 2002), with the rate of young mothers 
returning to work rising. This is placing heavy strains on childcare. The Howard Government 
recognised this by removing the cap on the number of after-school care and family day-care 
places, leaving it to the market to determine the level of supply and demand.  They estimated 
this will result in 25,000 additional childcare places by 2009. This change does not affect 
long-day care, which is not subject to centralised regulation although this is where the places 
are needed if women are to obtain secure full-time employment. Of course PPS recipients 
don’t have to work until children are of school age, but the changes affect those who wish to 
work while their children are younger than this.  Child care costs are rising, up by 50 percent 
since 2000, with access to the rebate of 30 percent restricted (Plibersek 2005).  The 
Government’s policy on childcare is an incomplete solution and does not address 
psychological and other health effects of long-day care for children (Knox et al. 2003). 
Deregulation of the childcare industry may well exacerbate these concerns, as the 
Government has not addressed the lack of qualified childcare workers. 
 
Lee (2005) notes women employed full-time experienced more difficulty in obtaining 
childcare, emphasising the need for long-day care places and the fact that women are likely to 
seek part-time and casual employment to fit their carer roles. Lee’s (2005) study did not factor 
in income in this conclusion. However, she noted that women working up to 14 hours a week 
relied on informal care, primarily grandparents. This raises implications for the demand that 
older workers remain in the workforce longer and for grandparents to go from welfare to 
work. Who will be there to look after the children? She also found that the HILDA data shows 
a disparity between the number of hours actually worked and the preference for hours worked. 
Mothers who worked fewer hours showed greater satisfaction but still had a preference to 
work longer hours while those mothers working longer hours had greater stress and a 
preference to work shorter hours. This may well demonstrate the difficulty in getting the right 
balance between work and family and supports Pocock’s (2005a) assertions that the 
Australian labour framework offers part-time work as the only solution for mothers.  
 
PART III CONCLUSION 
The industrial relations changes, together with the welfare and tax reforms, demonstrate a 
clear ideological preference for OECD-based ideals favouring free market forces, and a move 
away from collective bargaining, unionism and the rights of workers. The protective function 
of industrial relations systems has largely been forgotten.  The preference for employer 
flexibility is argued to lead to greater productivity. However, in a globalised competitive 
world, the challenge to make profits may well mean, despite the attempts of well intentioned 
employers to maintain reasonable working conditions for employees, employers will be 
compelled towards a ‘race to the bottom’ to maintain profit margins.  The Berns description 
of the ‘unencumbered worker’ remains alive and well in this legislation. 
 
This combination of legislation is bad for women because it: 
(a) gives the green light for even greater casualisation of the workforce – women are 
already over-represented in this category of workers; the paper has shown ways in 
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which employment protections for casually employed workers are not strong and the 
way in which this impacts women and families; 
(b) takes away the substantive power of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 
previously lauded as a key factor in improving working conditions for women over the 
years, reduces the safety net which women in particular rely on, and encourage people 
to negotiate individually, which as a generalization is more challenging for female 
workers than for male workers; 
(c) will lead to more hours at work for women, compromising the work-life balance even 
further, placing further stress on child care arrangements, when the right to paid 
parental leave in Australia remains unavailable to most workers; 
(d) encourages women away from welfare into a workforce with fewer protections than 
necessary and with increased penalties for failure to work, and less protection in 
welfare payments for the vulnerable. 
 
Our argument is not that the Federal Government has set out to attack working women; rather 
it is that the full complexity of factors affecting women at work has been ignored in the 
ideological push for more ‘flexibility’ at work indicated by this legislation.  It is this full 
range of factors considered collectively that shows the very negative social effects of the 
regime on women (and families more broadly), and should lead to a rethink of its foundations 
and its broader implications.  The raft of legislation can in some instances be used to entrench 
the marginalization of women at work.  It is not clear that this kind of socio-legal research 
was carried out prior to the introduction of the reforms.  In considering the issue of women 
and the new laws, it is hoped that industrial relations is not thought of merely as a legal issue, 
but as a much larger complex social issue.  Tinkering with one aspect can have unintended 
consequences elsewhere if the bigger picture is ignored.   It is time for Australian industrial 
relations policy to embrace the concept of work/family balance rather than ignore a worker’s 
non-work responsibilities. 
 
. 
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